As certainly as the dawn of new day, the Avenger comes,

but we cannot see him, and know not his character,

for darkness that engulfs us blinds our sight.

Is he a man of God; Christ Jesus come again?

or is he vengeful after his own cause, an Inquisitor,

who will inflict terror on those who oppose his rule?

We who seek and pray for justice must turn to God

for his solace is the hope of multitudes;

we must be diligent in our labors,

for the day of Righteousness comes.

But who approaches the near horizon --

the Son of Man, or another would-be god?

II

We stand at the gates of Babylon, her secrets exposed;

we have defrocked black-robed pretenders

who inflict the rule of private courts,

and have unraveled the myth of convoluted law.

These truths cannot be defamed -- they are candles

set in the midst of reprobates.

It is for them that the Avenger comes.

III

We who seek justice have touched the face of grief,

asking mercy for neighbor and friend;

we have labored to secure and expose the truth,

but have been rebuffed by proud, sanctimonious liars

who bloat themselves on pirated fruits,

the spoils of countrymen and kin.

How shall we greet the Avenger who comes?

Shall we demand justice, or again ask mercy,

That the reprobate, or at least his attendant, be spared?
 

Dan Meador; February 24, 1998; FMC-Lexington, at Lexington, Kentucky

Introduction

The Scheme & Its Effect

The Least Common Denominators

The Codes Are Unraveled

Basic & Essential Authorities

Breakdown of Drug & Internal Revenue Laws

I. Application of Federal Drug Control Laws

II. Application of Internal Revenue Code Taxing Authority

Underlying Compromise of the U.S. Marshal

Territorial Jurisdiction of Federal Law Enforcement Community

End Game Alternatives

As the original and first revision of this discourse circulated, other people began responding with additional research and constructive criticism, making expansion and more authoritative detail possible. Particular thanks go to Paul Mitchell, Timothy McCrory, and J. Halsbrook. Those who made factual and conceptual breakthroughs that contributed to the original composition are too numerous to name.

Dale Pond of Tulsa, Oklahoma edited the original and has continued to review each revision with the objective of helping frame technical material dredged from tens of thousands of pages of historical documents and government legalese so most any literate person can read and grasp both substance and implications of possibly the most diabolical scheme ever perpetrated against a developed nation.

A mere "thank you" is inadequate for my wife, Gail, who has endured humiliation and hardship since approximately 1995, and the many generous, patriotic people who have made the continuing effort to unearth and expose truth possible.

Gail and I share a life calling -- Christian ministry. We believe our nation was established in a unique historical moment, and that the Constitution of the United States emerged as a divinely inspired compact to serve widely divergent interests. It was not something fabricated out of thin air. Massachusetts Bay Colony established the first American constitution for civil government in 1636, basing it on precepts set out in the Mayflower Compact, signed by Pilgrims when they first arrived at Plymouth Colony in 1620, so the fledgling nation had over a century and a half of experience with written constitutions before the Constitution of the United States was drafted in 1787. While the Constitution does not specifically credit God as ultimate authority, many of the men who participated in the Constitutional Convention were also delegates to the Second Continental Congress, and had signed the Declaration of Independence, pledging lives, fortunes, and sacred honor to the cause of liberty.

The Declaration of Independence justified severance from British rule by the "Laws of Nature and Nature's God" -- physical and moral law man can neither author nor amend. These are the two great branches of natural law, acknowledged since time memorial even in civilizations that did not worship the Creator God acknowledged by Christian and Jewish religions. The Constitution preserves these principles by recognizing sovereignty of the people and preserving unalienable rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence. The Constitution must be understood in this context, the lineage being approximately six prior centuries in which principles of English-American common law were time-tested, proven, and articulated.

Central to this understanding is that nobody is above the law, and no manmade law contrary to the Laws of Nature and Nature's God is or can be legitimate as it is destructive to the body politic and the cultural fabric. Those who usurp power not enumerated in and specifically delegated by the Constitution are in rebellion against man, nature and God -- they are reprobate. As they pursue self-serving ends, they breach public trust, threaten peace and domestic tranquillity, and cause injury to countryman and kin. In the end, they bring destruction on themselves as history has proven time and again that tyranny has no friends.

While this effort addresses details of the scheme that undermines and compromises the sovereign American people, Gail and I stand firm in the belief that God blessed America from the beginning, and in the latter Twentieth Century, is exposing the fraud through people prepared for and appointed to the task. The means of peaceful correction can and should be primarily through exposure -- documentation and disclosure of truth. Truth will ultimately prevail.

Ponca City, Oklahoma

This scheme was made possible by emergence of a second government. Yet even today, those not familiar with the two capacities of United States government find it difficult to grasp implications. However, some who held responsible positions when the second or shadow government emerged saw the danger. Justice Harlan, a justice on the Supreme Court of the United States, was among them. One of his more lucid criticisms was written in his dissenting opinion in Downes v. Bidwell (1901), the first of four insular tax cases that provided a conceptual platform for the current de facto (authority in fact, but without law) system that engulfs not only insular possessions of the United States, but State republics party to the Constitution:

The idea prevails with some -- indeed, it found expression in arguments at the bar -- that we have in this country substantially or practically two national governments, one to be maintained under the constitution, with all its restrictions; the other to be maintained by Congress outside and independently of that instrument, by exercising such powers as other nations of the earth are accustomed to exercise. It is one thing to give such a latitudinarian construction to the Constitution as will bring the exercise of power by Congress, upon a particular occasion or upon a particular subject, within its provisions. It is quite a different thing to say that Congress may, if it so elects, proceed outside the Constitution. The glory of our American system of government is that it was created by a written constitution which protects the people against the exercise of arbitrary, unlimited power, and the limits of which instrument may not be passed by the government it created, or by any branch of it, or even by the people who ordained it, except by amendment or change of its provisions.²

This division, and limited application of the Constitution, was what alarmed Justice Harlan and others who clearly understood that a house divided cannot stand -- that the "permissive" would eventually overcome the "restrictive" government. They were correct. Cooperative Federalism, known as Corporatism into the 1930s, evolved to crowd out legitimate government required to operate within the confines of constitutionally-enumerated powers. An idyllic view of the scheme was articulated by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969):

The Great Depression of the 1930's exposed the inadequacies of state and local welfare programs and dramatized the need for federal participation in welfare assistance. Congress determined that the Social Security Act, containing a system of unemployment and old-age insurance as well as the categorical assistance programs now at issue, was to be a major step designed to ameliorate the problems of economic insecurity. The primary purpose of the categorical assistance programs was to encourage the States to provide new and greatly enhanced welfare programs. Federal aid would mean an immediate increase in the amount of benefits paid under state programs. But federal aid was to be conditioned upon certain requirements so that the States would remain the basic administrative units of the welfare system and would be unable to shift the welfare burden to local governmental units with inadequate financial resources. Significantly, the categories of assistance programs created by the Social Security Act corresponded to those already in existence in a number of States. Federal entry into the welfare area can therefore be best described as a major experiment in "cooperative federalism" King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 317, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2133, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), combining state and federal participation to solve the problems of the depression.³

Distress from the increasingly confrontational system is sufficient that every legitimate key-question survey since 1990 has reflected that sixty percent or more of the nation's eligible voters distrusts politicians and political institutions down to and including local school boards. By September 1995, the distrust level topped 72%, and by May 1996, went over 80%; in November 1996, only 49% of the nation's registered voters bothered to vote, which was a distressing number due largely to only 35-40% of those eligible to vote having even registered. Consequently, few politicians elected in November 1996, including the President of the United States, represent much more than 10% of the eligible voters in their respective districts. As the last decade of the Twentieth Century draws to an end, national, state, and local governments are probably less representative of the people than at any time since Congress convened under the Constitution in 1789.⁴

In a more pointed survey, approximately 35% of those interviewed expressed manifest and rising anger toward Federal government. The summer 1998 survey abated some from a year earlier, but politicians such as Vice President Al Gore are concerned that what was previously articulated as anger has simply turned to cynicism, in many ways a more dangerous and enduring mindset. Those cynical and angry toward Federal government constitute a significant force approaching half the nation's adult population.

These surveys contradict pomp and circumstance proclaiming all is well. Americans aren't indifferent to personal and national welfare, generation of wealth, and sovereignty. The vast majority knows something is desperately wrong, but has been mystified and immobilized by the de facto scheme woven in the craft of wordsmiths and other means of deception which has evolved since approximately the Civil War, with what amounted to a constitutional coup de grace in the 1930s.

Encroachment has continued at a steady to accelerating pace since, hitting high gear in 1966 and after. By 1990, State and Federal governments incarcerated more people in total numbers and on a per-capita basis than any other nation in the world other than South Africa and the old Soviet Union -- prison industries had become the nation's fifth largest industry. The Department of Justice, to say nothing of corresponding State agencies, the Internal Revenue Service, and other Federal agencies, routinely seizes and/or confiscates in excess of $50 billion per year in privately-owned American assets.⁵ This frenzy has gone so overboard that by late 1997 and early 1998, even The Wall Street Journal, Forbes Magazine, and other influential mainline magazines and newspapers were publishing critical articles. In 1998, American incarceration numbers, now at 1.2 million nationally, and in excess of 113,000 in the Federal system, rank second in the world, with the former Soviet Union having the dubious honor of ranking first.

The combined force of adverse economic policy, and abusive administrative, and civil and criminal prosecution initiatives, is rapidly reaching critical mass -- a point where general civil disobedience, and eventually revolution, is inevitable unless something happens to alleviate mounting conflict. Common people feel alienated from and defenseless against their government, symptoms which characteristically lead to backlash and violent confrontation. This is the course of nations and empires throughout history, with nineteen of twenty-one known empires prior to 1935 having fallen from within due to economic collapse and destruction of key social institutions.⁶

Proper enforcement of law has the potential of averting disaster. Cooperative Federalism is imposed through fraud and illusion -- perpetrators operate in a de facto manner without lawful authority, so they are subject to criminal prosecution and civil remedies in lawful State and Federal courts. The problem is forcing those appointed or elected to judicial offices to convene constitutionally-authorized courts, or removing them from office so successors will.

Thanks to work of patriotic researchers across the nation, keys to unraveling convoluted State and Federal Codes are soundly in place. With solid conceptual footing, energy can be focused on untangling the maze, then deploying strategies to peacefully and lawfully correct the system. Scripture speaks to the matter in two contexts which are fundamental to the effort: The reprobate will be caught in his own snare, and in his second letter to Timothy, the Apostle Paul foretold that the reprobate would proceed no further as he would be exposed for all the world to see. These two approaches are fundamental to peacefully restoring constitutional rule.⁷

These are fatal flaws. Only district courts of the United States, as defined at 28 U.S.C. § 451⁹ (Section 451 of Title 28 of the United States Code), and three remaining territorial courts¹⁰, are courts of the United States. United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States are private courts; they do not exercise Article III or Article I (legislative-territorial) judicial authority of the United States.

The Article III district court was defined in a 1938 Supreme Court decision styled Mookini v. United States, as follows:

The term "District Courts of the United States," as used in the rules, without an addition expressing a wider connotation, has its historic significance. It describes the constitutional courts created under article 3 of the Constitution. Courts of the Territories are legislative courts, properly speaking, and are not District Courts of the United States. We have often held that vesting a territorial court with jurisdiction similar to that vested in the District Courts of the United States does not make it a "District Court of the United States."¹¹

The United States District Court is not a true United States court established under article 3 of the Constitution to administer the judicial powers of the United States therein conveyed. It is created in virtue of the sovereign congressional faculty, granted under article 4, § 3, of that instrument, of making all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to the United States. The resemblance of its jurisdiction to that of true United States courts, in offering an opportunity to nonresidents of resorting to a tribunal not subject to local influence, does not change its character as a mere territorial court.¹²

As used in this chapter the word "courts" includes the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of International Trade.

§ 91.2 Definitions.

(a) Agency means --

(1) An executive agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. 105, including the General Accounting Office,

(2) The Government Printing Office,

(3) The Library of Congress,

(4) The Office of the Architect of the Capitol,

(5) The Botanic Garden, and

(6) The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Federal Judicial Center, and any of the courts set forth in section 610 of title 28, U.S. Code. Section 610 defines "courts" to include the courts of appeals and district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the United States Claims Court and the Court of International Trade.

A somewhat different but maybe clearer approach is used in the definition at 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f). This subsection "defines" what courts of the United States are authorized by statute to convene grand and petit (trial) juries, and effectively bridges civil and criminal so far as lawful courts of the United States are concerned:

(f) "district court of the United States", "district court", and "court" shall mean any district court established by chapter 5 of this title, and any court which is created by Act of Congress in a territory and is invested with any jurisdiction of a district court established by chapter 5 of this title...

No Article III or Article I jurisdiction of the United States is vested in United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution. They are not courts created by Congress -- they are private courts created by a judicial consortium. These folks garbed in black were for the most part appointed under authority of Article III § 1 of the Constitution to preside in lawful courts of the United States, but without constitutional or statutory authority, elected to set up a system of private courts which operates under the territorial illusion.

Whenever territories of the United States were admitted to the Union, Article I territorial courts were replaced by Article III district courts of the United States. Prior to the 1920s, however, there doesn't seem to have been any real distinction in text so far as the district court of the United States v. the United States District Court is concerned. The problem was resolved via Supreme Court definition in Balzac v. Porto Rico (1922). However, in at least some legislation, court nomenclature was avoided, as was the case in the judiciary act of March 3, 1911 in statutory language governing transition from territorial to Article III courts. The fact that the territorial courts were abolished with admittance of a territory to the Union of several States is verified in §§ 62-64 of the act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1104:

Sec. 61. When any Territory is admitted as a State, and a district court is established therein, all the records of the proceedings in the several cases pending in the highest court of said Territory at the time of such admission, and all records of the proceedings in the several cases in which judgments or decrees had been rendered in said territorial court before that time, and from which writs of error could have been sued out or appeals could have been taken, or from which writs of error had been sued out or appeals had been taken and prosecuted to the Supreme Court or to the circuit court of appeals, shall be transferred to and deposited in the district court for the said States.

Sec. 63. It shall be the duty of the district judge, in the case provided in the preceding section, to demand of the clerk, or other person having possession or custody of the records therein mentioned, the delivery thereof, to be deposited in said district court; and in case of the refusal of such clerk or person to comply with such demand, the said district judge shall compel the delivery of such records by attachment or otherwise, according to law.

Sect. 64. When any Territory is admitted as a State, and a district court is established therein, the said district court shall take cognizance of all cases which were pending and undetermined in the trial courts of such Territory, from the judgments or decrees to be rendered in which writs of error could have been sued out or appeals taken to the supreme Court or to the circuit court of appeals, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same.

The means by which Congress vests territorial courts with judicial authority similar to that of Article III district courts of the United States is demonstrated in language employed to establish jurisdiction of the District Court of Guam, at 48 U.S.C. § 1424:

Sec. 1424. District Court of Guam; local courts; jurisdiction

(a) District Court of Guam; local courts

The judicial authority of Guam shall be vested in a court of record established by Congress, designated the "District Court of Guam," and such local court or courts as may have been or shall hereafter be established by the laws of Guam in conformity with section 1424-1 of this title.

(b) Jurisdiction

The District Court of Guam shall have the jurisdiction of a district court of the United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of title 28, and that of a bankruptcy court of the United States.

(c) Original jurisdiction

In addition to the jurisdiction described in subsection (b) of this section, the District Court of Guam shall have original jurisdiction in all other causes in Guam, jurisdiction over which is not then vested by the legislature in another court or other courts established by it. In causes brought in the district court solely on the basis of this subsection, the district court shall be considered a court established by the laws of Guam for the purpose of determining the requirements of indictment by grand jury or trial by jury.

This is not conjecture. Judges and the court clerk in the Eastern District of Kentucky have effectively confessed this conclusion in administrative and judicial forums. Law of the United States speaks clearly to the matter. Litigation is already filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky with the mandate to convene the Article III district court of the United States, with an affidavit of bias and prejudice that disqualifies all judges appointed to the district, the object being to force the Chief Judge of the 6th Circuit to convene the constitutionally-authorized and statutorily-established district court. The contention is supported by a letter from the office of the General Counsel for the Administrative Office of United States Courts.¹⁵ As of this writing, these initiatives are stalemated by inaction, but there has been no rebuttal to the obvious conclusions and legitimacy of the initiatives.

The character of the United States District Court is addressed several times in the body of this discourse, so we will rest the subject for now.

Next, it is particularly important to understand that the "United States of America" responsible for civil and criminal initiatives in United States District Courts is a government foreign to the United States that has no constitutional or statutory authority in the several States party to the Constitution. Where United States government has two capacities or characters, there are two distinct political alliances or coalitions named the "United States of America".

The original United States of America, spelled with capital first letters, was comprised of the thirteen original States joined to fight the American war of independence, and was formally established in Article I of the Articles of Confederation (1777). This same "United States of America" appears in the Preamble of the Constitution of the United States: "We the People of the United States..," established the Constitution, "... for the United States of America." The United States of America also has a function in Article II of the Constitution: By way of electoral college, the President is elected President of the United States of America, then at his inauguration is sworn in by oath as President of the United States.

The relationship of the Union of several States party to the Constitution, designated as the United States of America in the Articles of Confederation, is somewhat on the order of member nations who participate in the United Nations. By way of charter, signatory nations established the United Nations, but the charter does not vest unilateral authority in any of the participating nations; all actions of the United Nations, regardless of what nations participate, are engaged in the name and by authority of the United Nations. The Constitution of the United States enumerates certain powers vested in the governmental entity known and designated as the United States, not the United States of America.

Analogously, suppose several people decide to undertake an enterprise of some sort. Maybe they want to build cars. They might create a corporation, which is a legal fiction, and might name the legal fiction "agent" responsible for carrying out the enterprise the Ford Motor Corporation, General Motors, Chrysler, or anything else. Likewise, delegates of the United States of America compact could have named the confederation agent anything they wanted to. Rather than the "United States", they might have named the designated governmental entity the "Confederated Authority". The sense of what they did is related in the first three articles of the Articles of Confederation:

Article I. The Stile of this confederacy shall be "The United States of America".

Article II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.

Article III. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.

Ninth Article of Amendment

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Tenth Article of Amendment

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

The United States of America currently responsible for Federal civil and criminal initiatives is not the original. It is a political coalition, compact or alliance of insular possessions of the United States subject to sovereignty of the United States via Congress' plenary power (near-absolute) in territory belonging to the United States under authority of Article IV, Sec. 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution.¹⁶ By way of various sections of the United States Code, delegations of authority, treaties, etc., we know the substitute "United States of America" is territorial, it is a jurisdiction foreign to the United States, and it is defined as an agency of the United States (see notes following 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and 18 U.S.C. § 6, 1994 edition, derived from 18 U.S.C. § 80, 1940 edition). The entity is very probably classified or designated as a municipal corporation.

By putting the "United States" and the "United States of America" in the same statute or regulation, the two entities are distinguished as being unique and separate -- the "this is not that" test applies. The following is reproduction of 18 U.S.C. § 80, 1940 ed., and it does precisely what is required to distinguish the "United States" from the "United States of America":

§ 80. (Criminal Code, section 35(A).) Presenting false claims.

Whoever shall make or cause to be made or present or cause to be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, or any department thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, any claim upon or against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof, or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent; or whoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. [Underscore added]

One of the better high school athletes I've ever known was a sophomore when I was a senior. But I could never get his name straight -- he was either George Dennis or Dennis George. I still have to occasionally look in my old high school year book to recall which way it is. I can envision that if I didn't have the year book, I might find it difficult to locate him as most metropolitan telephone directories list people named George Dennis and Dennis George. If I wanted to locate the old high school friend, I would simply have to call those listed under both names until finding the right one. This is more or less the process required to determine the constitutionally-authorized governmental entity and the lawful Article III district court of the United States. Each has been isolated through the process of elimination.

Then there is a similar kind of confusion: When I was attending a university with over ten thousand students, I kept running into what I thought was the same guy. It was disconcerting because he would show up in places that didn't make sense. I might see him somewhere, then see him a second place and wonder how he managed to get from one place to the other ahead of me. Confusion was resolved when I saw look-alikes together -- they were identical twins.

The examples aren't precisely the same as the "United States" not being the "United States of America," but knowing there are two entities identified as the "United States of America" helps, then seeing the "United States" and the "United States of America" clearly set out in the same section of the United States Code or the Code of Federal Regulations provides the means for conceptual clarification and orientation. We can demonstrate that, "The United States is not the United States of America," then demonstrate by way of the Constitution and laws of the United States that the United States, not the United States of America, has lawful authority in the Union of several States party to the Constitution.

Ironically, proper principal and judicial authority are tied together in the Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. § 7402. This section, in subsection (a), is specific with respect to the "United States" being the lawful principal of interest, and the "district court of the United States" being the court where government may secure lawful remedies:

(a) To issue orders, process, and judgments

The district courts of the United States at the instance of the United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue in civil actions, writs and orders of injunction, and of ne exeat republica, orders appointing receivers, and such other orders and processes, and to render such judgments and decrees as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws. The remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not exclusive of any and all other remedies of the United States in such courts or otherwise to enforce such laws. [underscore added]

Making a non-criminal claim or complaint in a court is a "civil action," and it may be in two different forms. It may proceed "in the course of the common law," or "in the course of the civil law." The terminology of law is at best confusing for most people even where there is no deceptive intent, so there is an inherent problem of explaining the meaning of words and phrases even for many people who practice law. The problem is even worse where there is intentional deception, which is the case for the Internal Revenue Code and other titles of the United States Code.

The Internal Revenue Code is full of deception. One example relates to forfeitures. In the Internal Revenue Code, forfeitures are designated as "in rem" actions, and are to be executed in United States District Courts, this stipulation at 26 U.S.C. § 7323:

Sec. 7323. Judicial action to enforce forfeiture.

(a) Nature and venue.

The proceedings to enforce such forfeitures shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem in the United States District Court for the district where such seizure is made.

That the "United States", not the "United States of America", is the constitutionally and statutorily-authorized principal of interest, and must therefore be the prosecuting party via lawful courts of the United States, is reasonably easy to track through statutory authority relating to revenue laws. By going to the 1934 edition of the United States Code, authority of the "United States" is verified for actions to enforce forfeitures, etc. Authority is found at 28 U.S.C. § 732, 1934 ed., as follows:

§ 732. Suits for duties, imposts, taxes, penalties, or forfeitures. All suits for the recovery of any duties, imposts, or taxes, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture provided by any act respecting imposts or tonnage, or the registering and recording or enrolling and licensing of vessels, or the internal revenue, or direct taxes, and all suits arising under the postal laws, shall be brought in the name of the United States. [underscore added]

Sec. 919. All suits for the recovery of any duties, imposts, or taxes, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture provided by any act respecting imports or tonnage, or the registering and recording or enrolling and licensing of vessels, or the internal revenue, or direct taxes, and all suits arising under the postal laws, shall be brought in the name of the United States. [underscore added]

Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has determined authority of the "United States" to sue in the absence of statutory authority specifying the principal. In the absence of statutory authority, or statutes to the contrary, the Attorney General may initiate suit in the name and by authority of the United States (United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888); United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888)).

Finally, the matter is ultimately put to rest by the original judiciary act of September 24, 1789. The first section which speaks to authority of the United States is § 9, 1 Stat. 76:

Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That the district courts (c) shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States...

Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs...

Sec. 27. And be it further enacted, That a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four years ... (b) And to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States...

(c) Except as otherwise provided by law or Rule of Procedure, the United States Marshals Service shall execute all lawful writs, process, and orders issued under the authority of the United States...

In sum, virtually all Federal civil and criminal initiatives against individuals and non-governmental enterprise are filed in private United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States party to the Constitution in the name and by authority of the United States of America, a government foreign to the United States that has no constitutional or statutory authority in the several States party to the Constitution. These are the "least common denominators" for Americans assailed in civil and criminal forums since approximately 1948.

The broader scheme will make more sense after reading the next two sections. Motives behind the Cooperative Federalism scheme are simple -- wealth and power.

At the onset, an important fact needs to be established: The United States Code and State codes are not laws of the United States and the several States. The codes are merely classification systems; in and of itself, the United States Code does not vest a franchise of authority in any officer, department or agency of the United States, and does not create a liability or benefit for anybody. The same is true for State codes. Laws of the United States are published annually in the Statutes at Large; laws enacted by State legislatures are published in State session laws following each session of the legislature. So far as the United States Code is concerned, even those titles enacted as so-called "positive law" are merely "legal evidence" of laws of the United States; titles which have not been enacted as positive law are "prima facie" (by appearance) the law.¹⁷

The United States Code was first published in 1926. It has never been more than a classification system for laws of the United States. The first edition was based on the Revised Statutes of 1878, and session laws, published in the Statutes at Large, through 1926. Each year there is a supplement to the Code with laws passed in the immediate previous session, then every six or so years, a new edition incorporates original legislation, amendments, and repeals enacted since the previous edition was published. Supplements are then added each year until the next new edition is published. The 1994 edition, with supplements, is the sixth and current edition.

The purpose of the United States Code, and its nature, were stated clearly in the Preface to the 1926 edition, the first paragraph reproduced here:

This Code is the official restatement in convenient form of the general and permanent laws of the United States in force December 7, 1925, now scattered in 25 volumes -- i.e., the Revised Statutes of 1878, and volumes 20 through 43, inclusive, of the Statutes at Large. No new law is enacted and no law repealed. It is prima facie the law...

No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, as set out in section 1 of this Act, in which any section is placed, nor by reason of the catchlines used in such title.

The first three editions of the Code were reasonably straightforward (1926, 1934 & 1940), then in 1948 and after, an amalgamation process began which converges and distorts sections from various titles in the 1940 edition. The current 28 U.S.C. § 132, addressed in an earlier footnote, merges sections of the 1940 edition from titles 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, and 48, Territories and Insular Possessions, the latter relating principally to the territorial court of Hawaii prior to Hawaii being admitted as a State of the Union. The section is an amalgamation of two or more sections from previous editions of the United States Code and Acts of Congress, with the consequence being that people cannot simply read it and determine what portion has what application. The underlying laws were not amended, merely the amalgamated section in the Code. Therefore, sections of the Code are not law of the United States, as such. They are merely evidence that a law or several laws of that nature exist somewhere in the Statutes at Large.

Fortunately, there is a reasonably simple way to unravel the United States Code to demonstrate proper application of any given section: Following each section, there are Historical and Statutory Notes. These notes provide the history, and cites in the Statutes at Large where the original act and major amendments are located. By going to the original act citation in the Statutes at Large, the beginning cite can be secured, then that cite and/or the popular name of any given piece of legislation can be found in the Distribution Tables in the United States Code. The Distribution Tables provide a section-by-section breakdown of the bill published in the Statutes at Large, directing to where pieces of the legislation are located in the United States Code.

For example, taxing authority for Subtitles A and C and administrative and judicial sections in Subtitle F of Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code, are major sources of grief for people across the country. Subtitle A contains particulars relating to what most Americans know as the "income tax" -- technically, the "normal tax," enacted as a privilege tax against officers, employees and agents of United States Government in 1919 or before. Subtitle C includes statutory authority for Social Security tax, other social welfare taxes, and authority for payroll deductions. Today elements of the normal tax and Social Security-related legislation are scattered through titles 5, 26, 31, 42, and other titles. Generally speaking, judicial procedure for collection of these taxes, when delinquent, is in Title 5 of the United States Code, not Subtitle F of the Internal Revenue Code (see particularly 5 U.S.C. §§ 5512 & 5520). The General Accounting Office, as general agent for the Treasury of the United States, is responsible for initiation of judicial proceedings, not the Internal Revenue Service.¹⁸ This is but one example of the mire created by the entire United States Code, not just the Internal Revenue Code, and has been disabling for those who make sincere efforts to unravel laws of the United States. When proper use of the Code is understood, it is a handy tool, but it is not law of the United States -- it is merely evidence of law. Because of classification, merging and editing distortions, it is no longer even reliable evidence except for those willing to wade through volumes of legalese.

The Code of Federal Regulations has a corresponding finding aid called the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, authorized by the Federal Register Act at 44 U.S.C. § 1510.¹⁹ The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, along with other finding aids, is located in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations bears approximately the relationship to the Federal Register as the United States Code does to the Statutes at Large, with finding aids in the Index providing the bridge between statutes and regulations (see 44 U.S.C. § 1507).

The Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules lists sections and titles of the United States Code in numerical order, with sections that have published regulations listed having general application or application limited to the regulation listed, and those not listed having limited application to (1) government of the United States (see 5 U.S.C. §§ 301 & 302), (2) territories and insular possessions of the United States, and/or (3) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

In this scheme, any statute promulgated by Congress must be wed to an administrative regulation before it has the force and effect of law.²⁰ Via a statute promulgated by Congress in compliance with Article I § 7 of the Constitution, Congress effectively says, "This is the law," then the President or an executive officer by regulation says, "This is the application and the way the statute will be enforced." One is incomplete without the other; until a legitimate statute and general application regulation are joined, there can be no general application save as is applicable to the three limited and special jurisdictions listed above.

Another secret --the Director of the Administrative Office of Courts of the United States is responsible for publishing regulations governing conduct and operation of court officers and personnel such as clerks, probation officers and the like (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 603(a)(1) & 603(f)). It does not appear that these regulations are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, but must be secured from that office. They are required to be published in the Federal Register before having force and effect. Additionally, the Director produces a manual for conduct of United States magistrate judges. This is important to know as the courts themselves, through clerks as well as judges and other officers attached to the courts, are keepers at the gate. Having regulations in hand is vital to forcing compliance or filing complaints for removal and/or prosecution.²¹

Nearly all States joined to the Cooperative Federalism scheme have adopted the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act which sets out regulatory requirements similar to those in the Federal Administrative Procedures Act and the Federal Register Act. Comparable finding aids and indexes should be in place. State law for the several States respectively is in State session laws, not codes such as the Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, and administrative agencies are required to promulgate regulations along the same order as Federal regulations. Some States such as Kansas have compiled and organized administratively-promulgated regulations in publications similar to the Code of Federal Regulations, but others such as Oklahoma haven't. Without implementing regulations, delegations of authority, etc., both State and Federal authorities proceed without force and effect of law.

1. The Constitution of the United States must establish authority for all statutory enactments of Congress applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution, and the American people at large. Further, Congress must be legislating for the Union of several States rather than exclusively for territory of the United States before even enumerated powers are applicable in or to the several States. Therefore, determination of what capacity Congress is operating in -- the root source of constitutional authority -- is an indispensable element of constitutional authority.
2. Congress must create departments, including courts inferior to the Supreme Court, and empower the various administrative departments and courts, by way of statutes enacted in compliance with Article I § 7 of the Constitution. The following authorities establish and preserve this requirement: Art. I § 8.18 & Article III § 1 of the Constitution; 4 U.S.C. § 72.
3. Where Congress by statute vests authority in the President, the President may delegate authority to executive officers or departments by way of Executive Order published in the Federal Register. This requirement is at 3 U.S.C. § 301.
4. Where Congress by statute directly vests authority in an executive officer or administrative department, or authority vested in the President is delegated by Executive Order, the executive officer or department head may redelegate authority by delegation order. The requirement is in the Federal Register Act, at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a). This requirement also applies to legislative and judicial officers and departments, but not necessarily in the framework of the Federal Register Act.
5. Any given statute that prescribes a departmental function, creates an obligation, or prescribes a penalty, must be implemented by regulations published in the Federal Register. The requirement is in the Federal Register Act, at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a).

Through the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States (first Ten Articles of Amendment), and bills of rights in constitutions of the several States party to the Constitution, the American people specifically retained certain rights which were articulated in the Declaration of Independence (1776), and in the English-American heritage as early as the Magna Charta (1215). The rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, articulated in the Declaration of Independence, restated as rights to life, liberty and property in the Fifth Article of Amendment, were and are essential to freedom and prosperity. These unalienable and therefore inseparable rights, which are what American founders described as self-evident truth, are to freedom and prosperity as legs on a three-legged milking stool. To remove any of the three legs effectively destroys the stool.

The Tenth Article of Amendment is particularly important as it prohibits the government of the United States from exercising power which is not specifically delegated to it by and enumerated in the Constitution. When properly understood, the Tenth Article of Amendment works somewhat like a volley ball or tennis net, separating State and Federal authority. This frames what is called the Separation of Powers Doctrine -- State and Federal governments are postured as the antipodes or opposite ends of authority, with one operating inside the scope of its enumerated powers while the other operates in the scope of its enumerated and limited powers. Additionally, the Separation of Powers Doctrine distinguishes responsibility of the three branches of government -- executive and judicial branches do not have constitutional legislative authority, legislative and administrative branches do not exercise judicial authority, and legislative and judicial branches do not administer laws of the United States. Each branch has its role, and with few limited crossover areas that are gray in nature, one does not perform the functions of the other.

This principle is expressly articulated in Springer et al v. Government of the Philippines Islands, 48 S.Ct. 480, 277 U.S. 189, 72 L.Ed. 485 (1928), at 201 & 202:

It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that, unless otherwise expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the Legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or legislative power. The existence in the various Constitutions of occasional provisions expressly giving to one of the departments powers which by their nature otherwise would fall within the general scope of the authority of another department emphasizes, rather than casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate character of this basic rule.

Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions. It is unnecessary to enlarge further upon the general subject, since it has so recently received the full consideration of this court. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21, 71 L.Ed. 160.

The first essential authority where matters at hand are concerned, beyond the constitutionally-enumerated power, is statutory authority. The Constitution itself merely established the branches and authorizes authority each may exercise. At Article I § 8.18, the Constitution specifies that, "[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." The means for enacting laws is prescribed in Article I § 7.

Through this lawmaking authority, Congress may activate and enact all, some or none of any given power enumerated in the Constitution. This includes creating offices and/or agencies. For example, the Attorney General has been an officer in the administration almost from the time Congress first convened under the Constitution in 1789 (Act of Sept. 24, 1789). The Department of Justice wasn't legislated into existence until 1870 (Act of June 22, 1870). Since then, Congress has vested certain responsibilities in the Attorney General and/or the Department of Justice, or sometimes in departments Congress has created in the Department of Justice. By way of delegation of authority by the Attorney General, these various divisions of the Department of Justice, and departments or agencies attached to the Department of Justice, are charged with carrying out responsibilities prescribed by statute.

One of the more important statutory restrictions which secures and reinforces Congress' authority is at 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 & 72. The first of these sections establishes territory within the current borders of the District of Columbia as the seat of government for the United States; the second prohibits any government department from operating outside the District of Columbia save as Congress authorizes by statute:

Sec. 72. Public offices; at seat of Government

All offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law.

The Attorney General and the Federal Bureau of Investigation may investigate any violation of title 18 involving Government officers and employees...

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation was established in 1908 by the Attorney General, who directed that Department of Justice investigations be handled by its own staff..."

The Internal Revenue Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, the BIR to IRS name change being effected by T.D.O. 150-29, in 1953; BATF was split from IRS in 1972 by administrative order, not by Congress' statutory authority. No new governmental entity was created. These agencies, which are not part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States or the Treasury of the United States, have legitimate authority only in insular possessions and territorial waters belonging to the United States, all of which are subject to Congress' plenary power under Article IV § 3.2 of the Constitution. Neither has statutory authority beyond borders of the District of Columbia save in insular possessions of the United States, per 4 U.S.C. § 72.

The same statute condemns United States District Courts situated in the Union of several States, and the "United States of America" -- civil and criminal process in the Union of several States must issue in Article III district courts of the United States in the name and by authority of the United States (judicial authority over criminal actions in district courts of the United States at 18 U.S.C. § 3231 & civil actions relating to tax cases at 26 U.S.C. § 7402, cited elsewhere).

Another example of necessary statutory authority is rules of procedure for judicial process. By way of judiciary acts of 1789 and 1792, district courts of the United States were established as common law courts. Cases and controversies "arising under" the Constitution and laws of the United States (Article III § 2.1 "arising under" clause), and treaties enacted by authority of the United States, are to proceed in the course of the common law as established in England at the time the Constitution was implemented.²²

Current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Supreme Court Rules, and Federal Rules of Evidence are promulgated under statutory authority evidenced at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, particularly § 2072, and are applicable only in legitimate United States district courts, not in district courts of the United States.

This is one of the major deception moves made in 1948. In the 1920s, then again in the 1930s, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for equity, admiralty and maritime cases for Article III district courts of the United States. In fact, the 1934 edition of the United States Code appears confused on the matter as "one form of action" was already in statutory language, but rules of evidence and other statutory matters relating to the course of the common law had not been repealed. Revision and historical notes, which have been the responsibility of West Publishing from the beginning, articulated the confusion -- probably the editor was being dumb like a fox. Most consternation appeared to be straightened out by the 1940 edition, then in 1948, statutory authority for the rules, and the rules themselves, were amended to apply in United States district courts rather than district courts of the United States.²³ Equity, admiralty, and maritime cases proceed in the course of the civil law; cases at law proceed in the course of the common law. There is no presumption in the common law. When some matter of authority or liability is challenged, proof must be provided in an open hearing and be established by documentary evidence and testimony.

The course of the civil law operates to a great extent on presumption, even though there is no Federal Rules of Evidence rule for presumption relating to criminal cases (see notes for Rule 301, presumption in civil matters, Federal Rules of Evidence). In the course of the civil law, which presumes, "The will of the prince is law," presumption, including undisclosed presumption, may lie against the defendant, leaving the defendant to prove innocence rather than requiring the plaintiff to prove guilt or liability. Each of the several States party to the Constitution save Louisiana is a common law State; as a longtime French colony prior to United States acquisition in 1803, Louisiana was permitted to retain the Napoleonic Code, which was civil law. Read Downes v. Bidwell, 1901, cited elsewhere, for the history of how the Ordinance of 1787 for government of the Northwest Territory was extended to each new territory, assuring due process in the course of the common law, prior to the cession treaty ceding the Philippines, Puerto Rico, etc., following the Spanish-American War. The Ordinance of 1787 is part of the organic law of the United States, published in the first volume of the current United States Code.

Difference between due process in the course of the common law and due process in the course of the civil law is significant, and so long as the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Articles of Amendment are in place, Congress has no authority to bastardize the clear and straightforward rules of common law process. There is, in fact, no statutory authority for merger of rules governing process for actions at law with actions in equity, admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction.

Next is the statute being executed and prosecuted: What is the source of authority and application for any given statute, which may be "evidenced" by a section of the United States Code?

Questions framed in Wayman v. Southard, cited earlier, a decision written by former Chief Justice John Marshall, provide an important lesson. The first question was basically, "What does the Constitution authorize Congress to do?" relative to courts, process, etc. The second was, "What has Congress done?"

Too many involved in litigation jump the gun by arguing what the Constitution authorizes Congress to do, without stepping back to examine and question what Congress has done. Since the 1920s, what the Constitution authorizes Congress to do under Article I enumerated powers has been all but irrelevant as nearly all statutory enactments since have issued under Article IV authority in territory of the United States -- precious few laws of the United States now apply to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. Arguing about authority under the commerce clause and other broadly construed powers is a waste of time as Congress abandoned regulating commerce among the several States in favor of regulating commerce among territories and insular possessions of the United States, and foreign commerce, long ago. As another example, by way of the revenue act of November 23, 1921, Congress repealed virtually all excise taxes and other taxes applicable under Article I and Sixteenth Article of Amendment authority, the "normal" tax against officers and employees of the government of the United States being one of the few exceptions. The normal tax, patterned on the tax against Federal employees in 1862, was resurrected in 1919 or some time before. When the various taxes were reenacted at a later date, they were applicable in the District of Columbia and territories and insular possessions of the United States, or as might apply in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States.

It appears that governments of the several States are working through corporate structures, and via municipal corporations, are "acting" as though each is an instrumentality or political subdivision of the United States. This fraud is perpetrated by State legislatures adopting uniform acts, nearly all of which presume the adopting States are instrumentalities of the United States. However, at Article IV § 3.1, the Constitution condemns this:

New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State...

One of the grand paradoxes set up by this move to Article IV plenary power, as opposed to Article I delegated powers, is framed in the statute which authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b):

(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.

There is, however, a reasonably simple explanation for how Congress could delegate legislative authority: Congress vested repeal power in the Supreme Court under the Article IV territorial clause, not as pertains to the Union of several States party to the Constitution. This is demonstrated in Rule 54(c) application of terms, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure:

"Act of Congress" includes any act of Congress locally applicable to and in force in the District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico, in a territory or in an insular possession.

"State" includes District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, territory and insular possession.

The acid test is to examine application. To do that, consider corresponding authority for the Attorney General to imprison people, set out at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a):

§ 4001. Limitation on detention; control of prisons

(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.

The next element of authority is delegation of authority: By statute, Congress vests basic authority over any given title and various administrative functions in the President, an executive officer such as the Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury, or in departments of the United States government.

Where authority is vested in the President, he may redelegate it to executive officers, departments, etc., via Executive Order, the E.O. required to be published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq., particularly § 1505(a)). Specific statutory authority for Presidential Executive Orders is at 3 U.S.C. § 301. Where authority is delegated from the President to an executive officer, or is vested in an executive officer by statute, the executive officer must redelegate authority down line by way of delegation orders published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)). The Federal Register serves as public notice.

It is convenient that nearly all Attorney General delegation orders are reproduced in Part 0 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (28 CFR, Part 0). Reading this rather lengthy part provides an excellent outline of authority vested in the Department of Justice, the office of the United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, etc. However, the regulations can be misleading without knowing other particulars so they shouldn't be taken at what appears to be face value without considerable study. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is a corporation, it is no more a government department than the Federal Reserve System is, and no more a part of the Department of Justice than the Internal Revenue Service is part of the Department of the Treasury of the United States.

On the other hand, there are certain striking disclosures in Attorney General delegations of authority that don't require special knowledge, nor the aptitude of a rocket scientist. For example, the Attorney General delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.55 vests powers in the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice relative to those accused or convicted of crimes against the United States. Then the delegation order reproduced at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-1 authorizes the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice to act as "Central Authority" or "Competent Authority" under treaties authorized by Public Law 95-144 on behalf of the United States of America. Further authority relating to the United States of America is delegated at 28 CFR, Part 0.64-2.

The picture takes even better shape via the Director of the Bureau of Prisons: The delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.96 authorizes the Director to take custody of people accused or convicted of offenses against the United States; the delegation order at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b authorizes the Director to take custody of offenders from the United States of America under provisions specified in a treaty authorized by Public Law 95-144. The Director acts as agent of the United States in this transfer process. Under terms of Public Law 95-144, whoever is transferred from United States of America to United States custody must sign consent prior to transfer (see 18 U.S.C. § 4100(b)). Obviously, whenever the Assistant Attorney General over the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or their respective delegates, including United States Attorneys, wardens, U.S. Marshals, etc., act against someone prosecuted in the name and by authority of the "United States of America" beyond provisions of Pub.L. 95-144 where there is no treaty in place, the victim has not been properly extradited from his or her home asylum State, and has not signed consent to be transferred from United States of America to United States custody, those responsible are respectively acting as de facto agents of a government foreign to the United States. Since they frequently proceed under actual or threatened force of arms, they engage in treason, as defined in Article III § 3 of the Constitution.

Since they are reasonably short, the first paragraph of the Director of the Bureau of prisons delegation of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.96, and the entire delegation of authority at 28 CFR, Part 0.96b are reproduced below:

§ 0.96 Delegations

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is authorized to exercise or perform any of the authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed upon the Attorney General by any law relating to the commitment, control, or treatment of persons (including insane prisoners and juvenile delinquents) charged with or convicted of offenses against the United States...

§ 0.96b Exchange of prisoners.

The Director of the Bureau of Prisons and officers of the Bureau of Prisons designated by him are authorized to receive custody of offenders and to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America under a treaty as referred to in Public Law 95-144; to make arrangements with the States and to receive offenders from the States for transfer to a foreign country; to act as an agent of the United States to receive the delivery from a foreign government of any person being transferred to the United States under such a treaty; to render to foreign countries and to receive from them certifications and reports required under a treaty; and to receive custody and carry out the sentence of imprisonment of such a transferred offender as required by that statute and any such treaty.

Use of the two terms "United States" and "United States of America" in the same regulation clearly distinguishes one from the other. This new "United States of America" is territorial; as agent of the United States, the Director is authorized to transfer offenders to and from the United States of America to United States custody; United States of America jurisdiction is foreign to United States jurisdiction; and this United States of America evidently has authority to effect treaties under Public Law 95-144, so is political in nature even though it probably operates as a municipal corporation. It is a power foreign to the Constitution of the United States and the Union of several States party to the Constitution that has no constitutional or statutory standing or authority whatever in the several States. If there was no other evidence, Attorney General delegation orders at 28 CFR, Parts 0.55, 0.64-1, 0.64-2, 0.96 & 0.96b prove conclusions set out in this paragraph.

The Internal Revenue Code provides another interesting trail to follow: 26 U.S.C. § 7621 authorizes the President to establish revenue districts. Under authority of 3 U.S.C. § 301, the President may redelegate authority vested in him by statute to executive officers via Executive Order, the E.O. required to be published in the Federal Register in compliance with the Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)).

The search for the President's redelegation of authority would seem to be a blind trail as 26 U.S.C. § 7621 does not appear in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Therefore, there is no general application regulation applicable to the Union of several States party to the Constitution and the population at large. However, the President did delegate this responsibility to the Secretary of the Treasury via E.O. #10289. The Executive Order is published in the United States Code following 3 U.S.C. § 301; the applicable portion pertains to customs laws and the Anti-Smuggling Act. By again consulting the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules in the section on Executive Orders, it is found that application of authority conveyed by E.O. #10289 is 19 CFR, Part 101. There are no regulations pertaining to revenue districts in title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which would apply to income tax, normal tax, Social Security tax, and other taxes in Subtitles A, B & C of the Internal Revenue Code.

The easy way to determine what 19 CFR, Part 101 pertains to is to turn to the "List of CFR Titles, Chapters, Subchapters, and Parts", another convenient finding aid in the Index volume of the Code of Federal Regulations. This compilation immediately follows the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules.

Not surprisingly, title 19 of the Code of Federal Regulations covers Customs Duties, and Chapter I conveys authority to the "United States Customs Service, Department of the Treasury (Parts 1-199)". 26 CFR, Part 101 is the regulation styled "General provisions." By going to actual regulations at 19 CFR, Part 101, it is found that this is the authority to establish customs districts, and since the authority is vested in the United States Customs Service rather than the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, etc., one might be curious enough to write to the District Director of the Internal Revenue Service Arkansas-Oklahoma District, or some other district in one of the several States party to the Constitution, to ask what lawful authority he has for maintaining an internal revenue district in the Union of several States. Certainly it isn't 26 U.S.C. § 7621, E.O. #10289, or 19 CFR, Part 101 -- that authority is vested exclusively in the United States Customs Service. Unless an IRS or BATF district director, or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has a rabbit hidden in a hat, these agencies, both successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico, are exercising de facto authority -- authority in fact, but not in law. They are in defiance of the prohibition at 4 U.S.C. § 72, as well as sundry constitutional limitations.²⁴

It so happens that there is another authority: In 1956, via Treasury Delegation Order #150-42, the Secretary of the Treasury delegated authority to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the areas of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. Simultaneously, authority over these areas was removed from district and regional customs offices in Florida, Georgia, and New York. The delegation order was slightly amended in 1986 by T.D.O. #150-01. The 1986 order eliminated specific mention of the Canal Zone, which is no longer subject to Congress' Article IV § 3.2 legislative jurisdiction, and extended authority of the Commissioner to other areas of the world subject to jurisdiction of the United States. The Northern Mariana Islands have been added to the flock of insular possessions since 1956 (1976), and Guam and American Samoa were brought under internal revenue laws of the United States since 1960. The original Treasury Delegation Order 150-42, published on page 5852 of the 1956 Federal Register, is as follows:

By virtue of the authority vested in me as Secretary of the Treasury it is hereby ordered:

1. The Panama Canal Zone is removed from the Internal Revenue District, Jacksonville, and from the Atlanta Region; and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands of the United States are removed from the Internal Revenue District, Lower Manhattan, and from the New York City Region.

2. The Commissioner shall, to the extent of authority otherwise vested in him, provide for the administration of the United States internal revenue laws in the Panama Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

3. This order shall not be deemed to affect the procedures for administrative appeal existing immediately prior to August 1, 1956.

4. This order shall be effective as of August 1, 1956.

Dated: July 27, 1956.

[Seal] David W. Kendall,

Acting Secretary of the Treasury.

[F.R. Doc. 56-6280; Filed, Aug. 3, 1956; 8:50 a.m.]

Finally, any given statute which creates an obligation, prescribes a penalty, etc., must have an implementing regulation. This is required by the Federal Register Act, the applicable section at 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a), the same subsection that establishes the mandate for delegations of authority to be published in the Federal Register:

Sec. 1505. Documents to be published in Federal Register

(a) Proclamations and Executive Orders; Documents Having General Applicability and Legal Effect; Documents Required To Be Published by Congress. There shall be published in the Federal Register --

(1) Presidential proclamations and Executive orders, except those not having general applicability and legal effect or effective only against Federal agencies or persons in their capacity as officers, agents, or employees thereof;

(2) documents or classes of documents that the President may determine from time to time have general applicability and legal effect; and

(3) documents or classes of documents that may be required so to be published by Act of Congress.

For the purposes of this chapter every document or order which prescribes a penalty has general applicability and legal effect.

With this mandate soundly in place, we can do what amounts to a frontal attack: Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations is "Conservation of Power and Water Resources". There is no title in the Code of Federal Regulations for the Criminal Code, which is Title 18 of the United States Code. Each title 18 U.S.C. criminal statute listed in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and most aren't, relies on regulations promulgated under authority of some other United States Code title.

In order to document regulatory application, alleged offenses of nineteen people incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center-Lexington at Lexington, Kentucky were listed in order by U.S.C. title and section number, then checked against the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules. Very few of the alleged crimes appear in the Parallel Table of Authorities and Rules, and the few that do have regulations promulgated under titles 19, 26 & 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Title 19 is Customs Duties, under jurisdiction of the United States Customs Service; title 26 is Internal Revenue, in part at least under jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service; and title 27 is Alcohol, Tobacco Products and Firearms, under jurisdiction of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Customs, IRS, and BATF are listed as agencies of the Department of the Treasury. However, by consulting title 31 of the United States Code, it is found that IRS and BATF are not agencies in the Department of the Treasury of the United States. IRS and BATF are successors of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Puerto Rico; IRS and BATF are agencies of the Department of the Treasury, Puerto Rico, not the Department of the Treasury of the United States. This is generally confirmed by definitions in title 27 of the Code of Federal Regulations, aside from other evidence (see definitions in 27 CFR, Part 250.11). The list of Department of the Treasury of the United States bureaus and agencies is reflected in the table of contents for Chapter 3, Subchapter I of Title 31, U.S.C.:

Subchapter I -- Organization

Sec.

301 Department of the Treasury.

302. Treasury of the United States.

303. Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

304. Bureau of the Mint.

305. Federal Financing Bank.

306. Fiscal Service

307. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.

308. United States Customs Service.

309. Office of Thrift Supervision.

To further solidify where IRS & BATF have jurisdiction, and to establish where taxes in the Internal Revenue Code apply when there is geographical application, Consider definitions of the terms "United States", "State", and "Citizen" at 26 CFR § 31.3121(e)-1. These definitions apply to Social Security, unemployment tax, etc., with the original enactment in 1935. These definitions are possibly the clearest relating to administration of the Internal Revenue Code, and are particularly important as they demonstrate application to Alaska and Hawaii before 1960 but not after, and application to Guam and American Samoa after January 1, 1961:

(a) When used in the regulations in this subpart, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission as States, and (when used with respect to services performed after 1960) Guam and American Samoa.

(b) When used in the regulations in this subpart, the term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, means the several states (including the Territories of Alaska and Hawaii before their admission as States), the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. When used in the regulations in this subpart with respect to services performed after 1960, the term "United States" also includes Guam and American Samoa when the term is used in a geographical sense. The term "citizen of the United States" includes a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the Virgin Islands, and, effective January 1, 1961, a citizen of Guam or American Samoa.

(e) State, United States, and citizen

For purposes of this chapter --

(1) State

The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

(2) United States

The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense includes the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa.

An individual who is a citizen of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (but not otherwise a citizen of the United States) shall be considered, for purposes of this section, as a citizen of the United States.

§ 921. Definitions

(a) As used in this chapter --

(2) The term "interstate or foreign commerce" includes commerce between any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include commerce between places within the same State but through any place outside of that State. The term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of the United States (not including the Canal Zone). [Underscore added]

This conclusion is supported by the Constitution: The Second Article of Amendment secures the right to own and bear arms for the sovereign people of the several States party to the Constitution. The Fifth Article of Amendment also secures the absolute right of the people to life, liberty, and property except when taken in lawful courts by due process of law in the course of the common law. An absolute right includes the right to defend that which falls within the right -- life, liberty and property. And since there is no constitutional amendment which alters or limits the Second and Fifth Articles of Amendment, or lists firearms and related commodities as commodities Congress may regulate, it follows that the bevy of firearms laws in Chapter 44 of title 18 and related laws in title 26 of the United States Code were promulgated under Congress' Article IV § 3.2 plenary power in territory belonging to the United States. The cumulative evidence is sufficient to leave even the worst cynic with nothing more than shifting sand beneath his feet. Congress may tax something, but has no regulatory power unless the power is specifically enumerated.

Definitions above are also governed by long-standing principles of law thoroughly treated in The Federal Zone by Mitch Modeleski. The two principles, articulated long ago in Latin, are, "Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,", and "Noscitur a sociis." Both are found in Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition, as follows:

Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another. The certain designation of one person is an absolute exclusion of all others ... This doctrine decrees that where law expressly describes [a] particular situation to which it shall apply, an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.

Noscitur a sociis. It is known from its associates. The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis", the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it.

The definition of "includes" and "including" at 26 U.S.C. § 7701(c) is clumsy, but basically restates the two Latin principles:

(c) Includes and including.

The terms "includes" and "including" when used in a definition contained in this title [Internal Revenue Code] shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.

Sec. 1421a. Unincorporated territory; capital; powers of government; suits against government; type of government; supervision

Guam is declared to be an unincorporated territory of the United States and the capital and seat of government thereof shall be located at the city of Agana, Guam....

Sec. 1541. Organization and status

(a) Composition and territorial designation

The provisions of this chapter and the name "Virgin Islands" as used in this chapter, shall apply to and include the territorial domain, islands, cays, and waters acquired by the United States through cession of the Danish West Indian Islands by the convention between the United States of America and His Magesty the King of Denmark entered into August 4, 1916, and ratified by the Senate on September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. 1706). The Virgin Islands as above described are declared an unincorporated territory of the United States of America.

Suppose we're playing a football game: We're going to dress the Union team in blue, and the unincorporated insular possession team in red. For convenience, we're going to put the District of Columbia team in black and white striped shirts -- D.C. will be the referee. The blue team is subject only to general powers of the United States enumerated in the Constitution; the red team is subject to whatever powers Congress wants to exercise; and those in black-and-white striped shirts occupy what must sometimes seem like no-man's-land.

Where a statuto