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This article is being presented by The Informer, to all people who call
themselves "persons" when in a legal setting. The word "person" is not,
in legal terms or political terms, what one wants to be. Also, as you
will see the term "people" in political terminology is very bad for
one who loves freedom. Such as in the phrase "We the People." This will
quell and settle, once and for all, all the arguments that are flying
around about the term citizen and person, that never is settled. This
will also upset people that use the term Pro Se or Propria Persona.
I have rung the bell many times since 1990 and still people persist,
to their own detriment, to use these terms and tacitly admit they are
a "person." This will undoubtedly set some guru’s back a piece that
preach citizenship of a state is what you want to be. It will also set
back some guru’s who preach the 14th amendment, and that blacks were
not persons until the 14th Amendment was conceived. The History
here will show why their arguments are flawed. Of course this will inflame
those guru’s to no end. But this is not directed at them but to all
you "MEN" and "WOMEN" out there that don’t know what to
call yourselves when addressing any government in a political and legal
position. I just gave you the terms to use as you are a physical man
or woman reading this, are you not? The artificial you, with a name
spelled in all Capital letters, cannot read but has to have a representative.
That representative is you, the real live natural MAN or WOMAN and not
a "PERSON," is that not correct? Don’t know how to answer this, do you?
Well don’t be dismayed for you will after reading this. The truth is
here for all to see. I suspect that Men and Women are so brainwashed
by the spin doctors, and guru’s that have never studied this, will have
a hard time believing this. This comes from a Law book used to teach
in Law Schools across the Country. But you will not find it being taught
in this modern era, because to do so would put a very bad crimp in government's
control over the masses of people calling themselves "persons."
Do not think that after reading this you can go into any
court and they will say, my gosh you are right we have no control over
you. Just the opposite will be true and they can ask at least three questions
that will stop you cold in your tracks and they will walk all over you
like flies on a cow patty, because you will stammer and not be able to
answer them. At that point they will know that you don't know the correct
argument and you lose and BAD CASE LAW will be set. The next MAN that come
in with a correct understanding will lose right off the bat because of
the bad case law that you have set. I have seen this hundreds of times
in the patriot community when someone with a little knowledge is very dangerous
to other freedom loving MEN when jumping into water they think is two feet
deep only to find it 1000 feet deep and no way to get out.
The material below comes from a 13 volume set of Law
books.
This is from Vol. XIII AMERICAN LAW AND PROCEDURE.
JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS. By James De Witt Andrews LL.B.
(Albany Law School), LL.D. (Ruskin University) from La Salle University.
I have bolded the footnotes as they may be mixed within some paragraphs,
to separate them from the main text so it is not confusing. Starting at
the end of section 63;
"Jeremy Bentham, in his remarks in reference to the inexact
use of language by Blackstone in pages 47 and 49 of the Commentaries, says: "When leading terms are made
to chop and change their several significations, sometimes meaning one thing, sometimes another, at the
upshot perhaps nothing, and this in the compass of a paragraph, one may
judge what will be the complexion of the whole context" (31).
64. The legal conception of leading words. Inasmuch
as the word person, man, thing, property, rights, wrongs and actions are
leading terms constituting the designation of departments of the corpus
juris, it will be impossible to obtain clear conceptions of subjects connected
with these words until an understanding is agreed upon as to the sense
in which these terms are used. If we arrive at the meaning of these words
intended by Blackstone and make the same clear, we will have a better idea
of his method and perhaps a better opinion of it, and at the same time
will be able to show the distinction between the same words in the Roman,
the English and in American law.
Blackstone apparently uses the Roman
word persona as synonymous with the English word "person," and the latter
word interchangeably with "individual" and "man," whereas he might have
avoided all confusion by a closer adherence to that which he professed
to follow.
65. The word "person" defined. Gaius says "De Juris
divisione" [the divisions of the law] immediately preceding his division
of the law; then follows, "De conditione hominm" [meaning the condition
or status of men]. In the Institutes "De jura personarum" precedes the
expression "all our law relates either to persons, or to things, or to
actions,... The words persona and personae did not have the meaning in
the Roman which attaches to homo, the individual, or a man in the English;
it had peculiar reference to artificial beings and the condition or status
of individuals.(33)
33. Professor John Austin’s view.—"Many of the
modern civilians have narrowed the Import of the term ‘person’ as meaning
a physical or natural person. They define a person thus: ‘homo, cure statu
sue censlderatus;, a qauman being, invested with the condition of status.,
And, In this definition, they use the term status in a restricted sense,
as including only those conditions which comprise rights and as excluding
conditions which are purely onerous and burthensome, or which consist of
duties merely. According to this definition, human beings who have no rights
are not persons, but things, being classed with other things which have
no rights residing in themselves, but are merely the subjects of rights
residing in others. Such, in the Roman law, down to the age of the Antonlnes,
was the position of the slave." Austin’s Jur., vol 1, 358.
The signification in Our Jurisprudence .... The
word ‘Person,’ in its primitive and natural sense, signifies the mask with
which actors, who played dramatic pieces in Rome and Greece, covered their
heads. These pieces were played in public places. and afterwards in Such
vast amphitheaters that it was impossible for a man to make himself heard
by all the spectators. Recourse was had to art; the head of each actor
was enveloped with a mask, the figure of which represented the Part he
was to play, and it was so contrived that the opening for the emission
of his voice made the sounds clearer and more resounding, vox personabat,
when the name persona was given to the instrument or mask which facilitated
the resounding of his voice. The name persona was afterwards applied to
the part itself which the actor had undertaken to play, because the face
of the mask was adapted to the age and character of him who was considered
as speaking, and sometimes it was his own portrait. It is in this last
sense of personage, or of the part which an individual plays, that the
word persona is employed in jurisprudence, in opposition to the word man,
homo. When we speak of a person, we only consider the state of the man,
the part he plays in society, abstractly, without considering the individual".
1 Bouvier’s Institutes, note 1.
Austin’s Jur., 362.
See 4 Harv. Law Rev., 101,
Austin’s Jur., 363.
The word "homo" corresponds to the English word "man,"
and, as the Romans expressed it, "unus homo sustinet plures personas;"
i.e., one man has many persons, or sustains many status, or many different
conditions (34) AUSTINS JUR., 362)
Austin says: "The term ‘person’ has two meanings, which
must be carefully distinguished. It denotes a man or human being; or it
signifies some condition borne by a man (35 See Harvard Law Revues 101).
A person (as meaning a man) is one or individual, but a single or individual
person (meaning a man) may sustain a number of persons (meaning condition
or status)" (36 Austins Jur., 363).
Notice that this meaning is not so broad as that given
by Ortolan. It does not include artificial persons. Again, he says: "As
throwing light on the celebrated distinction between jus rerum and jus
personarum, phrases which have been translated so absurdly by Blackstone
and others,--rights of persons and rights of things, jus personarum did
not mean law of persons, or rights of persons, but law of status, or condition.
A person is here not a physical or individual person, but the status or
condition with which he is invested. It is a remarkable confirmation of
this that Gauis, in the margin purporting to give the title or heading
of this part of the law, has entitled it thus: De conditione hominum; and
Theophilus, in translating the Institutes of Justinian from Latin into
Greek, has translated jus personarum . . . diviso personarum; understanding
evidently by persona . . . not an individual or physical person, but the
status, condition or character borne by physical persons. This distinctly
shows the meaning of the phrase jus per sonarurn, which has been involved
in impenetrable obscurity by Blackstone and Hale. The law of persons is
the law of status or condition; the law of things is the law of rights
and obligations considered in a general manner, or as distinguished from
these peculiar collections of rights and obligations which are styled conditions
and considered apart.
A moment’s reflection enables one to see that man and
person cannot be synonymous, for there cannot be an artificial man, though
there are artificial persons. Thus the conclusion is easily reached that
the law itself often creates an entity or a being which is called a person;
the law cannot create an artificial man, but it can and frequently does
invest him with artificial attributes; this is personality, which we see
and by which we are affected.
The law does not distinguish between men except by their
personality, as king or magistrate, or as parent or husband or wife, etc.
While the idea may be difficult for the tyro to grasp, the personality,
i.e., this condition or status of a many is entirely the creation of the
law. By nature all men are created free and equal, i.e., of equal rank,
equal rights; but the law does not look upon all men as equal, though in
the law of the United States all men have equal civil rights (39).
The question is asked, Who is that man? The reply would
be, that is the king or lord so and so, or the chief justice or the president
or governor. But what is the name of this personage? The name indicates
the man, the title, rank or legal standing of the person.
The word "persons" denoted certain conditions of rank
or status with which a man was clothed by law. To adopt the language of
the same author, "the term ‘person,’ as denoting a condition or status,
is therefore equivalent to character (40). It signified, originally, a
mask worn by a player, and distinguished the character which he represented
from the other characters in the play. From the mask which expressed the
character, it was extended to the character itself. From characters represented
by players, or from dramatic characters, it Was further extended by a metaphor
to conditions or as status. For men, as subjects of law, are distinguished
conditions, just as players, perform by their respective conditions, just
as players, performing a play are distinguished by the several persons
which they respectively enact or sustain" (41). As we shall see, the word
had a still broader meaning.
"A slave," says Holland, "having, as such, neither rights
or liabilities, had in Roman law, strictly speaking, no ‘status,’ ‘caput,’
or ‘persona.’ On the day of his manumission, says Modesfinus, ‘incipit
stature habere.’ Before manumission, as we read in the Institutes, ‘nullurn
caput habuit’" (42).
The following is the explanation given by Mr. Sandars
in Ms translation of the Institutes: "The word persona had, in the usage
of the Roman law, a different meaning from that which we ordinarily attach
to the word ‘person.’ Whoever or whatever was capable of having, and being
subject to, rights, was a persona. All men possessing a reasonable will
would naturally be personae; but not all those who were, physically speaking,
men, were personae. Slaves, for instance, were not in a position to exercise
their reason and will, and the law, therefore refused to treat them as
personae."
"On the other hand, many personae had no physical existence.
The law clothed certain abstract conceptions with an existence, and attached
to them the capability of having and being subject to rights. The law,
for instance, spoke of the state as a persona· It was treated as
being capable of having the rights and of being subject to them.
39 See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 368.
40 Hale nowhere speaks of status, but uses the term
"character" or "capacity." See note 60. below.
These rights really belonged to the
men who composed the state, and they flowed from the constitution and position
of associated individuals. But, in the theory and language of law, the
rights of the whole community were referred to the state, to an abstract
conception interposed between these rights and the individual members of
society. So, a corporation, or an ecclesiastical institution, was a persona,
quite apart from the individual personae who formed the one and administered
the other. Even the riscus, or the imperial treasury, as being the symbol
of the abstract conception of the emperor's claims, was spoken of as a
persona. The technical term for the position of an individual regarded
as a legal person was status" (44).
Ortolan’s explanation of personality.(45) The substance
of the above was undoubtedly taken from Ortolan’s treatment of the subject
as given in his History of the Roman Law, which is submitted because it
is clear and concise:
"The word ‘person’ (persona) does not in the language
of the law, as in ordinary language, designate the physical man. This word
in law has two acceptations: In the first, it is every being considered
as capable of having or owing rights, of being the active or passive subjects
of rights.
"We say every being, for men are not alone comprised therein.
In fact, law by its power of abstraction creates persons, as we shall see
that it creates things, which do not exist in nature.
Thus, it erects into persons the state, cities, communities,
charitable or other institutions, even purely material objects, such as
the fiscus, or inheritance in abeyance, because it makes of them beings
capable of having or owing rights. In the inverse sense, every man in Roman
law is not a person. For example, slaves were considered as the property
of the master, especially under the rigorous system of primitive legislation,
because they are the object and not the subject of law. This, however,
did not prevent the Romans from including them in another sense in the
class of persons.
"We shall therefore have to discriminate between and to
study two classes of person: physical or natural persons, for which we
find no distinctive denomination in Roman jurisprudence except the expressions
taken from Ulpian, singularis persona; that is to say, (46) the man-person;
and abstract persons, which are fictitious and which have no existence
except in law; that is to say, those which are purely legal conceptions
or creations.
"In another sense, very frequently employed, the word
‘person’ designates each character man is called upon to play on the judicial
stage; that is to say, each quality which gives him certain rights or certain
obligations-for instance, the person of father; of son as subject to his father; of husband or
guardian. In this sense the same man can have several personae at the same
time. Slaves were not persons in the
United States until after the abolition of slavery.
43 Hammond’s B]k. 334, note.
44 Sandars’ Justinian, Introduction, P. 26.
45 Ortolan’s History of the Roman Law is among the
best. It is, unfortunately, not easily obtained.
The last two paragraphs embrace all that Austin gives us in the quotation
given above.
From what we have seen, the following conclusion may be
drawn: The words persona and status were not synonymous, though very nearly
so. The word "person" had two meanings:
First. Every being, artificial or natural, capable of
having or owing rights.
Second. The characters, capacities, qualities or positions
which the law ascribed to certain men as individuals—that is, rank, condition,
capacity-status.
The technical term for the second meaning, namely, the
position, quality, character which a man bears, is status.
Status is not so broad as person, but always related to physical men.
A slave had no rights, no rank, no standing, no capacity,
and consequently no status. This applies, of course, only to the earlier
days of Roman law, for subsequently slaves were given a standing as men.
"In the earlier days of Roman law," says Sandara "no
one would have conceived this to be unnatural" (48).
In the days of Gaius, it seems, slaves are treated as
persons, for he says: "Persons are freemen or slaves" (49).
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In England all men were persons, and were divided into
certain classes or ranks by virtue of which they had especial characters,
capacities, rights, privileges and immunities; for instance, the right
of magistracy’ as king, as lord, etc. These were artificial. In human societies
men have certain standing, position, capacity, according as they are sovereign
or subjects, parents and children, husband and wife, or citizens.
We have seen something of the etymology of the word, also
its meaning and application as used in the :Roman law. We know that the
word "person" is a familiar one in English literature, both in England
and America. We are endeavoring to ascertain whether in the English language
we have a right to oppose persons to things for the Purpose of classification
of rules of law, and if thereby we convey intelligent ideas.
We know that all laws emanate from persons and also that
they operate against or upon persons(50); that is, all law certainly from
laws, and that the principle of classification adopted is the difference
in the objects to which the rules relate.
There can be found in the Commentaries of Blackstone no
definition of the word person, nor any explanation of the meaning
46 Does not this equal "individuals?" See 10 Harvard Law Rev., 101.
47 Ortholan’s History of Roman Law, 567-68.
48 Sandals’ Justinian, Int., 27; Austin’s Jur., lect.
12, P.358 49 Galus, 1-9; Austin’s Jur., 358.
addresses persons. So of rights. We know that rights
belong to persons, and that in that sense there cannot be the rights of
things. It should be borne in mind that we are endeavoring to classify
the body of laws, and not the rights which are resultant intended to be
ascribed to the word "person,"and the word is there used indiscriminately
in the popular and legal sense, interchangeably with "man" and "individual,"
and also to designate artificial beings capable of having rights; and there
is not the slightest hint that in using the Roman expressions there is
any change intended from the Roman idea of the word "person," though he
does treat under the rights of persons what he styles absolute rights,
which would be called "things" in Roman law.
§ 66. Scope of the word "thing." Of things
(51), which is the subject of the second book, Blackstone says:
"The objects of your inquiry in this second book will be the jura rerum,
or those rights which a man may acquire in and to such external things
as are unconnected with his person." Why not say unconnected with him,
himself? These are what the writers in natural law style the "rights
of dominion or property." This is the only definition given of the words
"property" ‘or "thing;" that is, the jura rernm equals those rights which
a man may acquire in and to external thlngs. Otherwise put, the rights
of things are rights which a man may acquire in and to things unconnected
with his person; and these are what writers in natural law style property;
yet in the treatment of this subject the learned commentator treats the
subject of contracts, the main feature of which is its obligation, or,
in other words, the power which the law affords one person of enforcing
it by . . . ..
WE now go further into the book and this is what it has
to say about you people who want so much to be a part of the body politic
and want the Constitution as your God and then claim that you are free
from the tether of government. IT AIN"T GONNA HAPPEN AND YOU HAVE BEEN
SUCKERED IN HOOK, LINE AND SINKER WHEN CLAIMING SO AND ARE COMPLETELY DOMINATED
BY THEM.
50. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 332; 92’ ld. 554; United
States v. Harris, 106 id. 629; Civil Rights Cases, 109 id. 3. A state may
in a sense fall under the designation, and laws be directed against states;
but as the state acts by individuals, in the same manner it is operated
upon through individuals.
51. Observe the word "chose," which will be explained
hereafter. Its meaning has an important bearing on the modified meaning
of both "person" and "things." Vol. XII 12
CHAPTER VIII
THE PEOPLE.
§ 104. The people: Identity. In the United
States the people are brought on the stage as an acting political entity,
acting, it is true, always through representatives. As expressed by Wilson,
one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence: "In free states
the people form an artificial person or body politic, the highest and noblest
that can be known" (1 Wilson’s Works).
By "the people" of a state is meant all of the (members)
which compose that state and are integral parts of it, together making
a body politic (2 Penhollowv Doane, 3 Dall. 55, 93).
[PEOPLE, THIS IS A STRAIGHT OUT ADMIRALTY CASE IN CASE
YOU DIDN'T KNOW AS IT DEALT WITH LAW MERCHANTS, YOU KNOW THEM AS CORPORATE
ENTITIES]
The people as a corporate unit form an artificial person
or body politic; thus constituted they form a moral person". "It is this
person we call a state. (4 1 Wilson’s Works 321-325: 2 Wilson’s Works 321)"
"There is no distinction between the people and the state" (5 Penhollow
v Doane, 3 Dall 93).
It must not be forgotten that, in using the expression
"the people," there is a distinction between the population of the nation,
as individuals, and the same population organized under a constitution.
By "the people," in this connection, we intend a body politic, a corporate
unity. Because of the quality of singleness we may properly use the pronoun
"it," though, this is not usual. It is hard for the citizen to lose sight
of the individuals in the body; but correctly viewed, as drops of water
lose their forms as drops when they mingle with the whole and become not
drops, but one body, even so the citizen in his political capacity loses
the civil capacity of an individual when viewed as a part of that great
unit "the people."
It is the whole mass, and not a majority of the individuals
composing it, which constitutes the people, and the people are to be regarded,
not as an unorganized mob, but as a corporate unity composing a society
(6). There are dicta to the effect that the people, when spoken
of in the political sense, means only those persons having the right to
vote, that is, the electors; and it is at the same time said that in the
electors is vested the sovereignty (7). Thus stated, the idea does
not, as we shall see, properly obtain, and is contrary to the principles
of American institutions (8). Voters are but parts of the machinery
of government (9). In the constitution "the people, is sometimes
used to indicate persons or individuals. So in all provisions in reference
to unreasonable seizures and searches. In such provision it is identical
with the use in Blackstone.
6. Jameson, Const. Con. (4th ed.), pp. q8,
19, notes: Von Holst’s Con.
Law, 48, 49; Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 92.
"A distinction was taken at the bar between a state and
the people of the state. It is a distinction I am not capable of comprehending.
By a state forming a republic (speaking of it as a moral person), I do
not mean the legislature of the state, the executive of the state, or the
judiciary, but all the citizens who compose the state, and are, if I may
so express myself, integral parts of it; all together forming a body politic.
The great distinction between monarchies and republics (at least our republic)
in general is, that in the former the monarch is considered as the sovereign,
and each individual of his nation as a subject to him, though in some countries
with many important special limitations. This, I say, is generally the
ease, for it has not been so universally. But in a republic, all the citizens
as such, are equal, and no citizen can rightfully exercise any authority
over another but in virtue of a power constitutionally given by the whole
community, and such authority, when exercised, is In effect an act of the
whole community, which forms such body politic. In such governments, therefore,
the sovereignty resides in the great body of the people, but it resides
in them not as so many distinct individuals, but in their political capacity
only. Thus A., B., C., and D. are citizens of Pennsylvania, and as such,
together with all the citizens of Pennsylvania, share in the sovereignty
of the state. Suppose a state to consist exactly of the number of 100,000
citizens, and it were practicable for them all to assemble at one time
and in one place, and that 99,999 did actually assemble. The state would
not be in fact assembled. Why? Because the state in fact is composed of
all the citizens, not of a part only, however large the part may be, and
one is wanting." Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall. 93.
7. Cooley’s Const. Lira. 40, citing Blair v. Rldgely, 41 Mo. 63; 97 Am:Dec. 248
.8. Wilson’s Works, App’x A, IX 566; McOrary on Elections
(4th ed.), sec 13.
9. State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 498.
§105. Capacity. Power. Sovereignty. We may
now examine the powers of the people, and in the course of this examination
but little time need be spent upon theory or metaphysical discussion of
what ought to be the law governing the matter, but will, as far as possible,
be conferred to the practical, visible facts.
The discussion of the capacities of that person we term
"the people" necessarily involves the discussion of What is termed sovereignty.
Let no one suppose that this question is an impracticable one and that
it has no further.
I END THIS SECTION HERE --GO TO THE NEXT SECTION 132 AND--
STARTING AT THE END OF THE PAGE WHICH CONTAINS WHAT I WANT YOU TO SEE.
"To fully appreciate the idea of sovereignty and the federal
court has appellate jurisdiction of a suit by a state against an individual
(13). The palpable injustice of the rule has led to several ingenious devices
to avoid its application (14), such for example as the assignment of the
cause of action to a person competent to sue, (e.g. a state), which, however,
must be a real assignment (15).
The sufficient reason for the rule is found in the expression,
"it is the written law"; the motive for it throws no light on its application
(16).
§ 133. An individual contracts with a state at his peril.
It is now well settled that there is no judicial remedy
in favor of an individual against a state to compel the performance of
a contract (17), though it is settled that a state can pass no law impairing
the obligation of a contract once made (18). The only security for state
loans rests on the plighted faith of the state as a political community;
that is, upon the same basis as contracts with independent governments
(19). States are not, like nations, independent of each other, and are
not permitted to allow the use of state names for the purpose of enforcing
claims really owned by individuals.
As to torts and injuries: It is no answer to a tort or
an active infringement of a right or a threatened injury that the action
was taken or is proceeding under supposed official duty or by virtue of
official power: such cases are not damnum absque injuria.
There you have it people. I did not highlight anything
in the main text that was not already there or italicized. This is devastating
against the Government of State and Federal. Do you want to find out how
corrupt "your" government is? Well after this hits the net the Government
will pull from the shelves of all the libraries and law schools where some
of these volumes might be, just as Hitler did to the German people so they
would not learn the truth. What makes you think this country’s slime balls,
called government officials and the lawyers that run this country,--count
the number of executive and legislative persons there are that are lawyers,--
are any different? They are not. In those countries it was brutality, here
it is legality with words, but the results are the same, -- complete control
of the Men and Women. But of late it has become apparent that brutality
is showing its ugly head starting with IRS, ATF and DEA abuse of the people
under the directives of upper level "persons" that legally can’t throw
enough men and women in jail fast enough.
I’ll tell you that the law professors know this and they
taught it. They can’t teach it now , by government dictate. Lawyers are
only taught what the establishment wants taught. The legal profession has
so much moral turpitude oozing from their pores that compared to a chicken
house that hasn't been cleaned in a month, on a 100 degree day, make it
smell like a bed of roses.
As Shakespeare said very eloquently, "The first thing
we do is hang all the lawyers." Yes, and Virginia Colony was correct back
in the 1700’s that the practice of lawyering was an offense punishable
by death. They sure dropped the ball on that one.
So the problem at hand is that every statute is written
with the term "person" in mind. Why, you ask? Well as I quoted in my book
"The New History of America," the case of Cruden v Neale,
where the court states a principle of natural law so clear that it cannot
be twisted by any lawyer, that man is only bound by the laws of nature.
Here is what the court stated;
" When a change of government takes place, from a monarchial
to a republican government, the old form is dissolved. Those who lived
under it, and did not choose to become members of the new, had a right
to refuse their allegiance to it, and to retire elsewhere. By being a part
of the society subject to the old government, they had not entered into
any engagement to become subject to any new form the majority might think
proper to adopt. That the majority shall prevail is a rule posterior to
the formation of government, and results from it. It is not a rule binding
upon mankind in their natural state. There, every man is independent of
all laws, except those prescribed by nature. He is not bound by any institutions
formed by his fellowmen without his consent." CRUDEN v. NEALE, 2 N.C.
338 (1796) 2 S.E. 70. Emphasis added.
By this very principle espoused by the court you cannot
be made to "retire elsewhere" because, if anything, you retire from the
corporate STATE and live upon the land of the Lord in the geographical
place called North Carolina rather than the State of North Carolina. Go
back and look at the Hamilton case where they said that you "* * * shall
take an oath of abjuration and allegiance, or depart out of the State."
Let them keep their corporate State; depart out of it. Isn't that what
the Bible tells you "Come out of her?" What do you need it for? To continually
be robbed by legal plunder? Not that they are going to stop if you do,
because maybe, just maybe, the masses will wake up and want out also, thereby
destroying the State’s power over you.
You see, the whole game is to control you by making you,
the man, into a artificial entity called a "person." In ordinary street
language you can use the term person. But the minute you step into ANY
legal arena you CANNOT use the term "person." For to do so the other artificial
person, the State, can come after another artificial character. As the
court stated above "man" is not bound by other men’s laws unless he
consents. You consent when you answer to any statute containing any reference
to person. The clever trick is that the statute 26 USC 7701(a) of the
IRC is the definition part and it says "person" means; an individual, partnership,
corporation, association. Notice that all terms defining the word "person
are corporate fictions. BUT, you say, individual is not a corporate fiction
because am I not an individual? Yes you are in average common street terms,
but in the legal arena "individual is corporate or artificial by legal
definition, because "individual," in and of itself is defining an artificial
thing as a "person." So how can it be a natural man? It goes against
all reason and logic. The IRC Code Statute only pertains to man, who as
stated above by the Professor, takes on the artificial character and becomes
a "person" by legal definition. Therefore he is subject to all the legal
disabilities that come with the term person and that means being subject
to all the laws of the parent corporation. The parent corporation is the
United States, the State is the artificial child and you are the artificial
grand child. That is the best way to describe it so you can start to equate
terms and meanings.
In Anderson’s Business law on the Uniform Commercial Code,
I think around the sixth edition, it states that when a statute refers
to artificial beings, natural people are not to be included. So, 26 USC
7701 (a) (1) uses all artificial characters to describe the artificial
"person" and individual. By all reason and logic it has to be an artificial
term. Just like a third grade reader shows 5 pictures and asks which one
does not belong. The pictures are, a baseball, a bat, a base, a glove and
a football uniform. You circle the football uniform as not fitting the
idea, but the football clothes is a uniform, the same as baseball clothes
is a uniform. Only one uniform fits the scheme while the other is left
out, but both are uniforms. The same as individual. It is a "leading word"
as the professor stated and has to be further defined the same as individual
or person has to be defined. Did not the professor state the term individual
and person are one in the same? Did he not also state that it is well settled
in law that "person" is always an artificial person? Refresh your memory
by finding that part of his statement.
The Informer
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